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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1765 
_____________ 
 
MICHAEL GERHART, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
EXELON CORPORATION 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-00425) 
District Judge: Lawrence F. Stengel 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR., and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  February 6, 2012) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Michael Gerhart (“Gerhart”) brought suit against his former employer, Exelon 
Corporation (“Exelon”), in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, 
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alleging claims under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, as well as 
intentional interference with prospective contractual relations.  The case was removed to 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Shortly thereafter, Exelon filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  The District Court granted the motion on the ground that Gerhart 
had waived his claims in signed agreements with Exelon.   
 Since no substantial question is presented by Gerhart’s appeal, we will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential 
facts. 
Gerhart’s employment at Exelon’s Limerick, Pennsylvania nuclear power plant 
commenced in 1996.  In 2003, he sought and was granted unescorted access to the plant, 
in a process similar to obtaining security clearance.  As part of that process, he signed a 
“PADS Consent Form”1
                                              
1 PADS is the Personnel Access Data System, a database used by the commercial nuclear 
power industry “to share information necessary to process applications of workers for 
unescorted access to nuclear power plant protected areas.”  (App. 41.) 
 with which he agreed that Exelon could “obtain, retain and 
transfer information necessary to determine whether to grant [him] unescorted access.”  
(App. 41.)  The Form specifically noted that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(“NRC”) requires that “this information be used in determining that an individual is 
trustworthy, reliable, and fit-for-duty prior to granting and while maintaining unescorted 
access.”  (Id.)  It also released Exelon and its agents from “any and all liability based on 
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their authorized receipt, disclosure, or use of the information obtained pursuant to this 
Consent.”  (Id.) 
In April 2007, Gerhart was interviewed by Exelon’s security manager as a witness 
to an alleged act of sexual harassment that had taken place in a locker room at the plant.  
After the interview, Gerhart left a telephone message for the alleged victim.  When 
confronted by the security manager about the inappropriateness of this contact, Gerhart 
“clarif[ied]” his earlier testimony.  (Id. at 17.)  Exelon determined that Gerhart had 
provided false information during this internal investigation and, as a result, it denied him 
unescorted access to the nuclear power plant based on concerns about his 
“trustworthiness and reliability.”  (Id. at 43.)  Gerhart appealed this decision, but the 
appeals were denied.  Although a peer review process determined that he had not been 
lying, his unescorted access was not restored.  Without unescorted access, Gerhart could 
not perform his job duties, and he was terminated on November 20, 2007. 
As part of the termination process, Gerhart signed a Waiver and Release drafted 
by Exelon in exchange for receiving thirty-three weeks of severance pay and other 
severance benefits.  With that document, Gerhart agreed that “[i]n exchange for the 
optional severance benefits to be provided . . . I knowingly and voluntarily agree to this 
waiver and release of claims.”  (Id. at 44.)  Included were “claims of whatever nature that 
I now have or that I may ever have against the Released Parties up until the date I sign 
this Waiver and Release.”  (Id.)  The release provided examples of waived claims and 
explicitly included claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and claims of 
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discrimination in employment, retaliation, wrongful discharge, and “any other common 
law tort or statutory claims.”  (Id. at 44-45.)    
Gerhart applied for employment with a number of other nuclear energy 
companies.  However, the record showing that Gerhart’s unescorted access had been 
rescinded by Exelon remained in the PADS database, accessible to other NRC-regulated 
entities.  Gerhart was selected for at least two other positions, but these prospective 
employers noted that record and opted not to hire him.   
Gerhart initiated this action against Exelon on August 14, 2008, by filing a 
complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the 
EEOC, Gerhart filed suit in Pennsylvania state court.  He later amended the complaint, 
alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), 
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963, as well as a tort claim 
for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations.  (App. 21).  He alleges 
that Exelon’s failure to rescind the denial of unescorted access constitutes an act of 
retaliation subsequent to his signing of the Waiver and Release.  The suit was removed to 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.       
Exelon moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gerhart had released Exelon 
from his claims with both the PADS Consent Form and the Waiver and Release he signed 
in order to obtain his severance package.  It also argued that a number of Gerhart’s claims 
were untimely and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of 
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unescorted access because nuclear power plant access is within the exclusive purview of 
the NRC.    
The District Court granted Exelon’s motion and entered summary judgment in its 
favor.  In its memorandum opinion, the District Court agreed that Gerhart had waived his 
claims by signing both waiver documents.  It noted that Gerhart had not raised any issues 
concerning the validity of the Waiver and Release and it rejected his argument that 
Exelon’s refusal to rescind the denial of unescorted access constitutes a post-termination 
action about which he had not waived his claims.  The District Court also noted that, 
since Gerhart had filed no response to Exelon’s Rule 56(c) statement of undisputed facts, 
it would consider those facts to be undisputed.  Gerhart timely appealed.   
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the final 
orders of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate “where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. at 216 (quoting Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc))).2
III.  ANALYSIS 
   
 Gerhart signed a Waiver and Release that expressly waived any “claims of 
whatever nature that [he] now ha[s] or that [he] may ever have against the [Exelon] up 
until the date [he] sign[ed] this Waiver and Release.”  (App. at 44.)  The District Court 
correctly noted that we hold such waivers to be valid so long as they were entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily.  Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Since Gerhart did not contest that he acted knowingly and voluntarily when he 
signed the waiver, the District Court properly found that he had waived all the claims at 
issue in this lawsuit.3
Gerhart presents to this Court virtually no argument challenging this conclusion.  
He argues only that, because Exelon’s peer review committee found that Gerhart had not 
been lying, Gerhart assumed when he signed the Release and Waiver that the denial of 
 
                                              
2  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was revised in 2010.  The standard previously set forth in subsection 
(c) is now codified as subsection (a).  The language of this subsection is unchanged, 
except for “one word — genuine ‘issue’ bec[ame] genuine ‘dispute.’”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 
advisory committee’s note, 2010 amend. 
3 Gerhart argues to this Court that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
before pretrial discovery had been taken.  Gerhart did not, however, file an affidavit in 
the District Court laying out his need for more time to conduct discovery, as required by 
Fed R. Civ. P. 56(d).  Accordingly, he has waived his objection to his alleged inability to 
obtain necessary discovery.  Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1994).     
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unrestricted access would not negatively impact his future employment prospects.  
Assuming that this contention is true, it does not affect the reality that he nonetheless 
waived these claims with the Release and Waiver.   
Further, even if we were to find that Exelon’s maintenance of the record of 
denying Gerhart unrestricted access somehow constituted an action taken by Exelon 
subsequent to Gerhart’s signing of the Release and Waiver, his claims would still be 
barred by the PADS Consent form.  That document released Exelon from “any and all 
liability based on [its] authorized receipt, disclosure, or use of the information obtained 
pursuant to this Consent,” information that includes the “[d]ate of any denial of access 
and the company holding the relevant information.”  (App. at 41.)  Accordingly, Gerhart 
waived his right to bring this lawsuit with two different documents.    
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, Gerhart’s appeal presents no substantial question.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
